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BRIEF MENTION.

Dr. RICHARD WAGNER has turned his attention from the articular infinitive (see A. J. P. VIII 331, IX 254) to the imperative infinitive, and, as his work is too valuable to disappear among the host of 'programmes,' I will at least indicate the results of his careful investigation, which is contained in the *Wissenschaftliche Beilage zum Programm des Fridericianum zu Schwerin i. M.*, 1890-91. Dr. Wagner shows that the *floruit* of this construction is to be found in Homer, Hesiod and the Homeric Hymns. After this time it begins to decline, and declines rapidly. It is but a shadow of its former self in the age of elegy and melos, but a dream of a shadow in the drama and in prose. In one sphere, however, it has held its own, and Dr. Wagner maintains that the imperative infinitive in legal language does not necessarily depend on the leading verb, and that it abides in Attic decrees with the same right that it abides in the Works and Days of Hesiod. As for its differentiation from the imperative, Dr. Wagner contends that it is a future imperative and a close parallel to the long future in Latin. Of course, all imperatives are in a sense future, and the imperative which is good for all time is good for the future as well. But according to Dr. Wagner the imperative infinitive is rare in the meaning of a universal imperative, except in the second person, in which it has the field to itself.

The great function of the imperative infinitive, it seems, is to be found in prescriptions, commissions, warnings, and the like, which are to take effect after an interval of time or under certain contingencies. Unfortunately, this signification is obscured by a number of occurrences, in which Dr. Wagner himself cannot recognize anything more than a certain intensity, a certain energy; and intensity and energy, like 'vivid,' 'more vivid,' 'most vivid,' cannot be brought to a satisfactory test; and the fulness of the form *μάχεσθαι* for *μάχεσθε* or *μάχον* may have more to do with the feeling than anything else.

As to the way in which the infinitive became an imperative, Wagner does not agree with those who consider that the infinitive has been degraded to an indefinite form of the verb, and who compare the imperative infinitive with the syntax of the German nursery. The dative-locative meaning had not died the death when it was informed with imperative sense. *μάχεσθαι* means 'zum Kampfe,' as we should say, 'To arms.' Now, a word has been said elsewhere as to the survival of the dative-locative in Greek (Trans. of the Am. Phil. Ass. 1878, p. 7), if that can be called survival that does not rise even to the dignity of subconsciousness. All the so-called exceptional constructions of the infinitive are more readily explained from the dative-locative than from the accusative origin, although the dative 'for which' and the accusative of the object effected meet. How far a case can be dead and yet live is a hard question. How far a case can be alive and yet die we can see from the behavior of our so-called Engl. inf. with the sign *to*, which is dead as the subject of the

verb and yet lives as the object of the verb, which takes an additional preposition *for* with the placidity of a corpse and yet revives to protest against such experiments as 'could save the son of Thetis from to die' (Spenser) and 'wythout to make any noyse' (Caxton). As an object the English infinitive has considerable imperative vitality and often presents a curious parallel to a Greek construction, which is not treated very generously in Goodwin's Moods and Tenses. I mean the construction of the imperative infinitive in the relative sentence. Nothing is more common in English than the insertion of a proviso in the form of an infinitive—'six of which to be ten feet long,' 'the winner to spend five shillings' (Dickens)—and the effect of this proviso is clearly imperative. In his section on this subject (756 of the new ed.) Professor Goodwin defends the *εἶναι* of Dem. 23, 26 by the *ἐξείναι* of Cod. Σ in 20, 158. He need not have gone so far afield, and if he had read further in the Aristocratea he would have found two more examples of the same inf., §§53, 60, and there are two in 36, 25, and yet another in 38, 5. The imperative force of the inf. survives even in the articular infinitive (Trans. A. P. A., l. c., p. 11; cf. A. J. P. II 473; Justin Martyr, Apol. I 3, 9), and the negative of the inf. is, to begin with, an imperative negative. The object of thought began by being an object of will, and there is no impassable gulf fixed between the *μή* of the will and the conceptional *μή*, as some scholars seem to think (A. J. P. XII 520).

The two great discoveries of recent times—the 'Αθηναίων πολιτεία and the Mimes of Herondas—have not lost a jot of their interest, and these two documents of antique life will continue to occupy the qualified and the unqualified for years to come, to the bewilderment of the slow quarterlies that cannot afford to register combinations and hariolations which the authors themselves will be glad to withdraw before a month is out. Two contributions, however, must be noticed as distinctly valuable. Mr. SANDYS's ed. of the *Athenian Constitution* (Macmillan & Co.) and Professor CRUSIUS's *Untersuchungen zu den Mimiamben des Herondas* (Teubner). Mr. SANDYS's 'Αθηναίων πολιτεία will be universally welcome not only as a storehouse of the best results of the work thus far done on text and commentary, but as an important contribution to the criticism and elucidation of the πολιτεία. Of this work, however, a detailed review is promised for an early number of the Journal.

CRUSIUS's book on Herondas is what its name implies—not a commentary, it is merely material for a commentary; but it is full of life and instruction, and gives young philologists an admirable lesson as to the importance of possessing a field before undertaking to dominate it. Crusius's command of the varied range postulated by his studies in the *Paroemiographi* has stood him in good stead, and whatever may be thought of his results here and there, the book is delightful reading and tempts to comment and extract. I have room for just two questions. Why, in writing of Phaselis (p. 39), did Crusius disdain to use the familiar passage about the Phaselites, [Dem.] XXXV 1, which is even more to the point than Cic. Verr. IV 10, 23, and makes the supposed proverb *εἰς Φάσηλιν πλεῖν* more likely? And is it not a mere fancy to see in the potential opt. without *ἂν* 'a special energy' (p. 71)? Apart from dialectic survival,

in most cases the omission of *av* does not denote a special energy on the part of the author, but a special laziness on the part of the scribe, sometimes a special indolence on the part of the interpreter.

Dr. BARKER NEWHALL sends to *Brief Mention* the following correction of an error in *Allen's translation of Wecklein's Prometheus* :

In Allen's translation of Wecklein's *Prometheus*, the note to l. 1005 reads : 'In entreaty the ancients raised the palms upwards. . . . This attitude is seen in the "praying boy" in the Berlin Museum.' This note stands in Wecklein's second edition, and a similar statement is found in Baumeister's *Denkmäler* (s. v. *Gebet*), to which the American edition makes reference. Both Allen and Baumeister have failed to notice that Furtwängler (*Jahrb. des Instit.* I 218) has shown the arms of this statue to be modern, and, from the evidence of a gem and from other monuments, has proved that the ancients in prayer turned the palms of their hands *outward*, and not inward, as in the Berlin statue. Consequently this figure gives a very incorrect idea of the proper attitude, and should not be cited as an example. Stengel states the matter correctly in Müller's *Handbuch* (V 3, 58), and cites a Halle dissertation by Vouillième ('*Quomodo veteres adoraverint*,' 1887). Daremberg and Saglio and Smith do not specify the attitude, but the latter has an illustration, taken from a British Museum vase, which shows it correctly (cf. Müller, *Pl. IV*, figs. 1, 2)."

Mr. EVELYN ABBOTT's edition of *Herodotus, Books V and VI* (New York, Macmillan & Co.), is intended for students of Greek history rather than for students of Herodotean style, and it would have been better either frankly to omit grammatical notes altogether or simply to refer the reader to the standard text-books. For instance, when Mr. Abbott reads (VI 133) *ἦν μὲν οὐ δῶσι* instead of *ἦν μή οἱ δῶσι* he justifies his adhesion to the older MSS by a reference to c. 9, 20, where we have the far different and far more familiar phenomenon of *οὐ* with ind. in an *εἰ . . . μὲν . . . δὲ* sentence. *οὐ* with subj. not preceded by *μή* is exceedingly rare, and is not to be accounted for by the idle note "When the negation is more important than the condition there is a tendency to substitute *οὐ* for *μή*." As if *οὐ* were more negative than *μή*! Under *μή οὐ* with the participle (VI 9) we have another unsatisfactory note and a helpless reference to Goodwin (M. and T. 818), whose conditional resolutions of *μή οὐ* with the participle will not be accepted throughout even by those who are satisfied with the conditional formula. And this is all the stranger, as Professor Campbell in his *Sophocles*, which he edited together with Mr. Abbott, clearly does not believe in the equivalence of *μή οὐ* and *μή*, in spite of the despairing tone of his *Grammar of Sophocles* (p. xli). For on O. R. 220 we read that '*μή οὐ* combines supposition and fact. *μή* would give the hypothesis merely.' And so far is the conditional formula from satisfying Mr. Whitelaw (miscalled Ridgeway, A. J. P. VII 169, q. v.) that he considered the relation consecutive, a position which seems to be untenable. The well-

known view of Kvičala (ap. Kühner, II 763) seems to be most nearly in accordance with the facts. *μη οὐ* with the participle, like *μη οὐ* with the inf., is an incorporated *μη οὐ* with the subj., and like *μη οὐ* with subj., carries with it the notion of a fear or, at any rate, an apprehension or surmise of the negative. This is discernible in the passage under consideration: καταρρώδησαν *μη οὐ* δυνατοὶ γένωνται ὑπερβαλέσθαι καὶ οὕτω οὔτε τὴν Μιλητον οἰοί τε ἔωσι ἐξελεῖν *μη οὐκ ἔδυντες* ναυκράτορες κτέ. *οὐκ ἔδυντες* would be causal, *μη ἔδυντες* hypothetical, while *μη οὐκ ἔδυντες* presents a pressing problem in which the feelings are involved. And so in all the other passages cited in my mutilated article in L. and S. and in Goodwin, l. c. The incorporation of the interrogative *quin* in Latin is a close parallel, the *qui*- in *quin* questioning very much as *μή* does. The difference between the theoretical condition propounded by *μή* and the practical problem dealt with by *μη οὐ* comes out very prettily in the passage referred to in this Journal (l. c.), viz. Philemon, fr. 83 (IV 30, Mein.; II 533, Kock):

ὦ Κλέων, παῦσαι φλναρῶν· ἂν ὁ κνής τὸ μανθάνειν
 ἀνεπικούρητον σεαυτοῦ τὸν βίον λήσεις ποιῶν.
 οἷτε γὰρ ναυαγός, ἂν *μη* γῆς λάβηται φερόμενος,
 οὐποτ' ἂν σώσειεν αὐτὸν οὐτ' ἀνὴρ πένης γεγώς
μη οὐ τ' ἐχνην μαθὼν δύναιτ' ἂν ἀσφαλῶς ζῆν τὸν βίον.

Compare also the *δεινὸν μη χρᾶσθαι* and the (*δεινὸν*) *μη οὐ λαβεῖν* of Herod. i, 187, in which the former remains a theory and the latter results in practice.

But enough of the downtrodden negatives. Much more interesting and important is what Mr. Abbott has to tell us of the downtrodden Greek tyrants. To one who comes fresh from Mr. Freeman's girdings at these poor creatures, Mr. Abbott's sensible excursus (X) on the same subject (V 92) is especially refreshing. True, the conclusion is not startling, and any one with an historical mind might have said in advance: "Whether tyrants are blamed or whether they are praised, we must be cautious in believing what is said about them." But even this commonplace is better than foaming at the mouth. "Le sens historique," says Perrot, "n'a pas de pire ennemi que le goût de la phrase."

A word in commendation of JUSTUS PERTHES' pocket *Atlas Antiquus* (New York, B. Westermann), which the editor, VAN KAMPEN, did not live to see published. Clear and convenient, it is a welcome companion to the student of ancient history and ancient literature.